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Abstract
Biological systems often consist of multiple interacting subsystems, the brain being a prominent example. To understand
the functions of such systems it is important to analyze if and how the subsystems interact and to describe the effect of
these interactions. In this work we investigate the extent to which the cause-and-effect framework is applicable to such
interacting subsystems. We base our work on a standard notion of causal effects and define a new concept called natural
causal effect. This new concept takes into account that when studying interactions in biological systems, one is often not
interested in the effect of perturbations that alter the dynamics. The interest is instead in how the causal connections
participate in the generation of the observed natural dynamics. We identify the constraints on the structure of the causal
connections that determine the existence of natural causal effects. In particular, we show that the influence of the causal
connections on the natural dynamics of the system often cannot be analyzed in terms of the causal effect of one subsystem
on another. Only when the causing subsystem is autonomous with respect to the rest can this interpretation be made. We
note that subsystems in the brain are often bidirectionally connected, which means that interactions rarely should be
quantified in terms of cause-and-effect. We furthermore introduce a framework for how natural causal effects can be
characterized when they exist. Our work also has important consequences for the interpretation of other approaches
commonly applied to study causality in the brain. Specifically, we discuss how the notion of natural causal effects can be
combined with Granger causality and Dynamic Causal Modeling (DCM). Our results are generic and the concept of natural
causal effects is relevant in all areas where the effects of interactions between subsystems are of interest.
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Introduction
Biological systems often consist of multiple interacting subsys-
tems. An important step in the analysis of such systems is to
uncover how the subsystems are functionally related and to study
the effects of functional interactions in the system. A prominent
example of a biological system with interacting subsystems is the
brain, having interconnected ‘units’ at many different levels of
description: e.g. neurons, microcircuits, and brain regions. It is the
current belief that much of what we associate with brain function
comes about through interactions between these different
subsystems, and to characterize these interactions and their effects
is one of the greatest challenges of the Neurosciences. Note that
this is not only an experimental challenge but also a conceptual
one. Indeed, even if given access to all the relevant variables in the
nervous system, it is far from obvious how to analyze how brain
activity relates to function.
In neurophysiology, the traditional approach to link brain
activity to function is to perturb the nervous system and observe
which variables change as a function of the perturbation. For
example, many cells in primary sensory cortices elicit spikes at a
rate that depends on a particular property of the stimulus (e.g.
[1,2]), and cells in the primary motor cortex tend to elicit spikes in
relation to sensory conditioned movements (e.g. [3]). This
approach is based on a conceptual cause-and-effect model: The
perturbation (e.g. sensory stimulus) is the cause and the response of
the nervous system (e.g. an increase in firing rate) the effect. There
are two aspects of this experimental situation that allow a cause-
and-effect interpretation: the perturbation is exogenous, or
external, to the system; and, the effect follows the cause only after
some temporal delay. That the perturbation is exogenous makes it
possible to disentangle spurious dependencies from those due to a
mechanistic (causal) coupling. The temporal delay between cause
and effect is in line with the intuitive notion that a cause must
precede its effect in time, and with our current understanding of
the underlying mechanisms (e.g. how light is transformed into
membrane currents and propagated through the visual system of
the brain). This cause-and-effect model has been successfully
applied to studies of response properties of single cells and brain
regions, as well as to the relation between isolated limb movements
and corresponding neuronal activity.
Perhaps inspired by the success of the cause-and-effect models
in sensory and motor neurophysiology, workers have more
recently started to look at interactions between different brain
regions using the same framework. That is, researchers try to
characterize the activity of one subsystem in terms of how it is
caused by the activities of other subsystems. Indeed, a lot of
theoretical and experimental work has been directed at investi-
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[4]), ‘causal relations’ (e.g. [5]), ‘causal influences’ (e.g. [6]), or
‘effective connectivity’ (e.g. [7,8]), to just mention a few. A major
difference with respect to the type of studies mentioned above is
that the ‘cause’ is typically not a perturbation introduced by the
experimenter. Rather, the joint natural activity of the subsystems is
decomposed in causes and effects by statistical techniques. One
crucial implication of this difference is that direction of the ‘causal
flow’ is not restricted a priori: Contrary to the case of an externally
applied stimulus, where the causality (if any) must ‘flow’ from the
stimulus to the brain, in the case of two interacting brain systems it
is quite possible that there is ‘causal flow’ in both directions. We
will see that this bidirectionality has serious consequences for a
cause-and-effect interpretation of interactions in the natural brain
dynamics.
In this work we take a critical look at the cause-and-effect
framework and demonstrate some fundamental shortcomings
when this framework is used to study the natural dynamics of a
system. We base our work on a standard model of causality that
has emerged in the fields of statistics and artificial intelligence
during the last decades (e.g. [9,10]), synthesized in the framework
of interventional causality proposed by Pearl [10]. In this
framework external interventions (i.e. perturbations) of the system
play a major role, both in defining the existence of causal
connections between variables as well as in quantifying their
effects. In our work we focus on situations where the interest is in
characterizing the effects of natural interactions going on in a
system. In such situations external interventions can not be used to
quantify causal effects as they would typically disrupt the natural
dynamics (c.f. [11]). We will analyze the conditions under which
the natural interactions between subsystems can be interpreted
according to a cause-and-effect framework. That is, our work is
not about determining if a causal connection exists or not, but
rather how to interpret the effects of existing causal connections.
We derive conditions for when the interactions between two
subsystems can be interpreted in terms of one system causing the
other. The main requirement is that the causing subsystem acts as
an exogenous source of activity. In particular, we show that the
effects of interactions between mutually connected subsystems
typically cannot be interpreted in terms of the effects that the
individual subsystems exerts on the remaining ones. A conclusion
of our work is therefore that the cause-and-effect framework is of
limited use when characterizing the internal dynamics of the brain.
The analysis is general and our conclusions therefore have
important consequences for the interpretation of previous studies
using different measures of ‘causality’, including Granger causality
and Dynamic Causal Modeling.
Results
In this section we first argue that it is important to distinguish
between three different types of questions asked about causality
and we introduce some basic notions about causal graphs. We
then, in a number of subsections, develop what is needed to reach
the main goal of the paper: to state conditions for when the effects
of natural interactions between variables can be given a cause-and-
effect interpretation. To reach this goal, we first give a brief
overview of the interventional framework of causality. We then
introduce an important distinction between situations where the
main interest is the effect of external interventions and situations
where the main interest is the impact of the causal connections on
the dynamics happening naturally in the system. Next the
conditions for when the natural interactions can be given a
cause-and-effect interpretation are stated. Subsequently, we derive
the consequences of these conditions for the special case of
bivariate time series. We further suggest some novel approaches to
the analysis of causal effects. Then we show how our work
complements and extends two common approaches of ‘causality’
analysis: Granger Causality and Dynamic Causal Modeling
(DCM). Finally we apply the analysis of causal effects to a simple
model system to illustrate some of the theoretical points made.
In this work we are concerned with sets of variables and their
interactions. We assume that the state of the variables is uncertain
and that we have access to the (possibly time-dependent) joint
probability over the variables. This is to avoid issues related to
estimation from data. Our results are generic but it might be
instructive to think of the variables as corresponding to the states
of a set of neurons or other ‘units’ of the brain. We will further
assume that the variables interact directly with each other, that is,
that the variables are, or might be, causally connected. Note that
experimental data sometimes reflect non-causal variables such as
the blood oxygenation level depend (BOLD) signal and local field
potentials (LFPs), in which case some additional level of modeling
might be needed in order to make inferences about causality (c.f.
[12]).
Three questions about causality
To put our work in proper context and to facilitate a
comparison with existing approaches to causality it is helpful to
separate questions about causality into the following three types:
Q1: Is there a direct causal connection from Y to X?
(existence)
Q2: How is the causal connections from Y to X implemented?
(mechanism)
Q3: What is the causal effect of Y on X? (quantification)
(here X and Y are two generic, and possibly high-dimensional,
variables). We will show that it is important to keep these questions
separate, and that different approaches are typically required to
answer them. This might seem obvious, but in fact these three
questions are often mixed into a ‘causality analysis’, and tools
appropriate for the first two questions are often erroneously used
to address also the third.
The first question (Q1) addresses the existence of a direct causal
connection between two variables. A causal connection is a
directed binary relation that carries only qualitative information. If
the distribution of X is invariant to perturbations in Y there is no
causal connection from Y to X. The total set of causal connections
in a system is referred to as the causal structure. For a system
containing a set V of variables Vk, k~1,:::,n, the causal structure
can very conveniently be represented as a causal graph in which the
nodes correspond to the variables and directed edges point from
Vk to Vk’ if there is a direct causal connection from Vk to Vk’. For
example, Figure 1A, shows a causal graph where there are direct
causal connections from Z to Y, from Z to X, and from Y to X.I f
the causal graph is without cycles (i.e. forming a directed acyclic
graph, DAG) then the joint probability over the variables can be
factorized according to the causal structure e.g. [10]. This is an
important and useful result that we will use below and that is used
extensively in the interventional framework of causality (see
below). In fact this factorization following the causal structure is
fundamental to relate the interventions to the joint probability (see
Supporting Information S1). The causal graph contains all
information needed to answer Q1. Unfortunately inferring the
causal graph from observed data (here, the joint distribution) is in
general not possible. A given joint distribution might be
compatible with different causal structures [10], in which cases
Limits of Causality Analysis
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more, the difficulty to infer the causal graph increases if there are
hidden variables, i.e. variables that are not observed. The
traditional approach to Q1 is therefore to experimentally modify
(perturb) one variable and study the impact on the remaining ones.
For example, the graphs in Figure 1A and 1B are both consistent
with a statistical dependence between X and Y.I fZ is not
observed, it is not possible to distinguish between ‘Y is causing X’
and ‘Y is not causing X’ without intervening (i.e. perturbing) the
system (see below). On the other hand, if Z is observed we see that
for the graph in Figure 1B, X and Y are conditionally
independent given Z, while for that in Figure 1A conditioning
on Z does not render X and Y independent. In these types of
causal structures Z is considered a confounder because, being a
common driver, it produces a statistical dependence between X
and Y even without the existence of any direct causal connection
between them.
Consider now the second question (Q2) about the mechanisms
implementing the causal connections. In the ideal case the answer
to this question would be given in terms of a biophysically realistic
model of the system under study. However, often one has to make
do with a phenomenological model that captures enough features
of both structure and dynamics to give an adequate description of
the system. That is, a model that is at some level functionally
equivalent to the real physical system. Such a functional model would
contain a formal description of how the variables in the system are
generated, and how each variable depends on the other ones. For
the causal graph of Figure 1A, the following formal equations
define a functional model:
Z~fZ(Uz)
Y~fY(Z,Uy)
X~fX(Z,Y,Ux),
where the U-terms stand for random (non-observable) distur-
bances. We note that deriving a functional model from a detailed
biophysical model, without modifying the impact of the causal
interactions, might not be trivial. Nor is it trivial to go from
experimental observations to a functional model that allows causal
inference about the real physical system.
Since the model built to answer Q2 must already contain all the
needed information to draw the corresponding causal graph,
answering Q2 implies also answering Q1. In particular, any
variable inside the function fVk is considered a parent of Vk (the set
of all parents is denoted pa(Vk)) and an arrow from it to Vk is
included in the graph. Since the functional model is supposed to
reflect the underlying mechanisms generating the variables, the
parents pa(Vk) are the minimal set of variables with a direct causal
connection to Vk. In such modeling approaches to causality it is
important to emphasize that all notions of causality refer to the
model and not to the system that is being modeled. In other words,
only if the model is a faithful description of the process generating
the variables can it be used as a model of real causal interactions.
In biology in general and in neuroscience in particular, the
variables of interest are often functions of time. In such cases the
functional model must be formulated in terms of dynamic
equations (typically as difference or differential equations) and
the variables represented in the causal graph will correspond to
particular discrete times. In fact, for differential equations (i.e.
representing a time-continuous dynamics), the causal graph
corresponds only to a discrete representation of the equations
(see [14] for a discussion of the correspondence between discrete
and continuous models).
Since the answer to Q2 contains a model consistent with the
mechanisms implementing the causal connections one may think
that this would also be enough to answer Q3, i.e. the causal effect
of Y on X. However, answering Q3 is not so straightforward. It is
clear that the causal graph (Q1) does not contain information
about the impact of the causal connections but only about their
existence. Similarly, from a set of dynamic equations the resulting
dynamics are only implicitly represented. This means that the
effects of the causal connections modeled by the equations can
typically not be read off directly from the equations. Rather, the
quantification of the causal effect has to be done by analyzing the
dynamics, either using observed data or, given the ‘correct’ model
that generated the data, using simulated data from the model or
analytical techniques. However, even if the required data are
available, one further needs to clearly define what is meant by the
causal effect that results from the causal connections. Therefore,
question Q3 has to be addressed separately and is typically not
reducible to answering Q2 or Q1.
In the rest of this work we will focus on this last question related
to the analysis and quantification of causal effects (Q3). Following
the distinction between the three questions about causality
discussed above we will be very precise with our terminology:
First, when talking about causal connections we will refer only to the
causal structure in the graph. That is, a causal connection from
variable Y to variable X exists if and only if it is possible to go
from Y to X following a path composed by arrows whose
direction is respected. In particular, a direct causal connection from Y
to X is equivalent to the existence of an arrow from Y to X. For
two sets of variables the causal connection between the sets exists if
it exists between at least a pair of variables. Second, when talking
about the causal effect from Y to X we will refer to the impact or
influence of the causal connections from Y to X. This impact
depends on the causal structure, on the actual mechanisms that
implement it, and is, as we will see, only appreciable in the
dynamics.
Causal effects in the framework of Pearl’s interventions
In this section we will define causal effects using the framework
of interventional causality developed by Judea Pearl and
coworkers (e.g. [10]). We note that this framework is closely
related to the potential outcomes approach to causality developed
by Donald Rubin and coworkers (e.g. [9]) and that the causal
effect used in that approach is fully compatible with the
corresponding entity in the interventional framework. The
Figure 1. Causal graphs illustrating the effect of interventions.
A: Graph showing a case where the statistical dependence between Y
and X is (partly) due to a causal interaction from Y to X. B: Graph
showing a case where the statistical dependence between Y and X is
induced solely by the confounding variable Z. C: Graph corresponding
to the intervention do(Y~y’) in the causal graph shown in A. D: Graph
corresponding to the intervention do(Y~y’) in the causal graph shown
in B.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032466.g001
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considered a ‘standard’ definition.
The starting point of the interventional framework is the
realization that a causal connection between two variables can
typically only be identified by intervening. That is, by actively
perturbing one variable and studying the effect on the other. This is of course
what experimentalists typically would do to study cause-and-effect
relations. As a motivating example, consider paired recordings of
membrane potentials of two, possibly interconnected, excitatory
neurons (X and Y say). If we observe that membrane potential of
neuron X tends to depolarize briefly after neuron Y elicited an
action potential, we might be tempted to conclude that Y has
causal influence over X. However, the same phenomenon could
easily be accounted for by that X and Y are receiving common (or
at least highly correlated) inputs. The obvious thing to do in order
to distinguish these two scenarios is to intervene, i.e. to force Y to
emit an action potential (e.g. by injecting current into the cell). If
depolarizations of the membrane potential of X are consistently
found after such interventions, we are clearly much more entitled
to conclude that Y has a causal influence over X. Note that the
crucial aspect of the intervention is that it ‘forces’ one variable to
take a particular value (e.g. fire an action potential) independently
of the values of other variables in the system. It therefore ‘breaks’
interdependencies that are otherwise part of the system and hence
can be used to distinguish between causal and spurious
associations. The recent study by Ko et al. [15] is an excellent
example of how interventions can be used to determine the causal
structure between single neurons, and how this structure can
account for observed statistical dependencies.
One of the contributions of the interventional framework of
causality is that it formalizes the notion of an intervention and
develops rules for how interventions can be incorporated into
probability theory [10]. Symbolically an intervention is represent-
ed by the ‘do(:)’ operator. For example, setting one variable, Vk,
in the system to a particular value, v, is denoted do(Vk~v). These
interventions to a fixed value are commonly used in framework of
Pearl’s causality. Experimental interventions rarely can be exactly
controlled, but the important point is not that a variable can be
fixed to a given value but that the mechanisms generating this
variable are perturbed. We will see below that the variability in the
intervention can be captured introducing a probability distribution
of interventions P(do(Vk~v)). The effect of an intervention on the
joint distribution is most easily seen when the joint distribution is
factorized according to a causal graph. In this case the intervention
do(Vk~v) corresponds to deleting the term corresponding to Vk
in the factorization and setting Vk~v in all other terms depending
on Vk. This truncated factorization of the joint distribution is
referred to as the postinterventional distribution, that is, the distribution
resulting from an intervention. In Supporting Information S1 we
give a formal definition of the effect of an intervention and some
examples. Graphically, the effect of an intervention is particularly
illuminating: intervening in one variable corresponds to the
removal of all the arrows pointing to that variable in the causal
graph. This represents the crucial aspect of interventions
mentioned above: intervention ‘disconnects’ the intervened
variable from the rest of the system. Figure 1A and B illustrate
two different scenarios for how a statistical dependence between Y
and X could come about. If only Y and X are observed, these
scenarios are indistinguishable without intervening. The causal
graphs corresponding to the intervention do(Y~y’) are shown in
Figure 1C and D. It is clear that only the graph shown in Figure 1C
implies a statistical relation between Y and X illustrating how the
intervention helps to distinguish between causal and spurious (non-
causal) associations. Indeed, interventions can generally be used to
infer the existence of causal connections. Conditions and measures
to infer causal connectivity from interventions have been studied
for example in [16,17].
Given this calculus of interventions, the causal effect of the
intervention of a variable Y on a variable X is defined as the
postinterventional probability distribution p(xjdo(Y~y)) (see
Definition 3.2.1 in [10] and Supporting Information S1). This
definition understands the causal effect as a function from the
space of Y to the space of probability distributions of X.I n
particular, for each intervention do(Y~y’), p(xjdo(Y~y’))
denotes the probability distribution of X given this intervention.
In Supporting Information S1 we show how p(xjdo(Y~y’)) can
be computed from a given factorization of the joint distribution of
X and Y. Note that this definition of causal effect is valid also if X
and Y are multivariate.
This definition of causal effects is very general and in practice it is
often desirable to condense this family of probability distributions
(i.e. one distribution per intervention) to something lower-
dimensional. Often the field of study will suggest a suitable measure
of the causal effect. Consider the example of the two neurons
introduced above, and let do(Y~y’) denote the intervention
correspondingto makingneuron Y emit an actionpotential.To not
introducenewnotationweletX and Y stand forboththe identityof
the neurons as well as their membrane potentials. Then a
reasonable measure of the causal effect of Y on X could be
E(Xjdo(Y~y’)){E(X): ð1Þ
That is, the difference between the expected values of the
postinterventional distribution p(Xjdo(Y~y’)) and the marginal
distribution p(X) (c.f. [18]). In other words, the causal effect
would be quantified as the mean depolarization induced in X
by an action potential in Y. Clearly this measure does not
capture all possible causal effects, for example, the variability
of the membrane potential could certainly be affected by the
intervention.
Intervening one variable is similar to conditioning on this
variable, this is illustrated both in the notation and also in the
effect of an intervention on the joint distribution. However, there
is a very important difference in that an intervention actually
changes the causal structure whereas conditioning does not. As
mentioned above, it is this aspect of the intervention that makes it
a key tool in causal analysis. Formally, this difference is expressed
in that p(Xjdo(Y~y’)) in general differs from p(XjY~y’).
Consider for example the case when X is causing Y but not the
other way around, i.e. X?Y, then P(Xjdo(Y~y’))~P(X)
whereas, in general, P(XjY~y’)=P(X).
A very important and useful aspect of this definition of casual
effect is that if all the variables in the system are observed the
causal effect can be computed from the joint distribution over the
variables in the observed non-intervened system. That is, even if
the causal effect is formulated in terms of interventions, we might
not need to actually intervene in order to compute it. See
Supporting Information S1 for details of this procedure and S2 for
the calculation of causal effects in the graphs of Figure 1. On the
other hand, if there are hidden (non-observed) variables, physical
intervention is typically required to estimate the causal effect.
Requirements for a definition of causal effect between
neural systems
The definition of causal effects stated above is most useful when
studying the effect of one or a few singular events in a system, that
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interventions. However, in neuroscience the interest is often in
functional relations between different subsystems over an extended
period of time (say, during one trial of some task). Furthermore,
the main interest is not in the effect of perturbations, but in the
interactions that are part of the brains natural dynamics. Consider
for example the operant conditioning experiment, a very common
paradigm in systems neuroscience. Here a subject is conditioned to
express a particular behavior contingent upon the sensory stimuli
received. Assume we record the simultaneous activity of many
different functional ‘units’. Then a satisfactory notion of causal
effect of one unit on another should quantify how much of the
task-related activity in one unit can be accounted for by the impact
of the causal connections from the other, and not the extent to
which it would be changed by an externally imposed intervention.
Of course, there are other cases where the effect of an intervention
is the main interest, such as for example in studies of deep brain
stimulation (e.g. [19]). In these cases the interventional framework
is readily applicable and we will consequently not consider these
cases further. We will instead focus on the analysis of natural brain
dynamics which is also where DCM and Granger causality
typically have been applied.
These considerations indicate some requirements for a defini-
tion of causal effects in the context of natural brain dynamics.
First, causal effects should be assessed in relation to the dynamics
of the neuronal activity. From a modeling point-of-view this
implies that the casal effect can typically not be identified with
parameters in the model. Second, the causal effects should
characterize the natural dynamics, and not the dynamics that
would result from an external intervention. This is because we
want to learn the impact of the causal connections over the
unaltered brain activity.
We will refer to causal effects that fulfill these requirements as
natural causal effects between dynamics. We will now see that it is
possible to derive a definition of natural causal effects between
dynamics from the interventional definition of causal effects. We
start by examining when natural causal effects between variables
exist and in the following section we consider natural causal effects
between dynamics.
Natural causal effects
As explained above, a standard way to define causal effects is in
terms of interventions. Yet, many of the most pertinent questions
in neuroscience cannot be formulated in terms of interventions in
a straightforward way. Indeed, workers are often interested in the
‘the influence one neural system exerts over another’ in the
unperturbed (natural) state [8]. In this section we will state the
conditions for when the impact of causal connections from one
subsystem to another (as quantified by the conditional probability
distribution) can be given such a cause-and-effect interpretation.
We first consider the causal effect of one isolated intervention.
For a given value y of the random variable Y, we define the natural
causal effect of y on the random variable X to be p(xjY~y) if and only if
p(xjY~y)~p(xjdo(Y~y)): ð2Þ
In words, if and only if conditioning on y is identical to intervening
to Y~y, the influence of y on X is a causal effect that we call a
natural causal effect. Since the observed conditional distribution is
equal to the postinterventional distribution given Y~y,w e
interpret this as the intervention naturally occurring in the system.
Note that this definition implies that if Eq. 2 does not hold, then
the natural causal effect of y on X does not exist.
Next we formulate the natural causal effect between two (sets of)
random variables. The natural causal effect of Y on X is given by
p(xjY~y)p(Y~y) ð3Þ
if and only if Eq. 2 holds for each value of Y. Note that Eq. 3 is a
factorization of the joint distribution of X and Y. Indeed we have
p(X~x,Y~y)~p(xjY~y)p(Y~y): ð4Þ
This means that if Eq. 2 holds for each value of Y then the natural
causal effect of Y on X is given by the joint distribution of X and
Y. At first glance it might seem strange that the factor p(Y~y)
appears in the definition of the natural causal effect (Eq. 3). After
all, the effects of the causal interactions are ‘felt’ only by X, and we
think of Y as being the cause. However, it is clear that the
conditional distributions p(xjY~y) will in general depend on y
which means that to account for the causal effects of Y on X we
need to consider all the different values of Y according to the
distribution with which they are observed. This means that we
must consider how often the different single natural interventions
Y~y happen, that is, we need to include p(Y~y) in the
definition.
An important characteristic of natural causal effects is that the
interventions they represent are not chosen by an experimenter (or
policy maker) but are ‘chosen’ by the dynamics of the system itself.
This means that we can think of the natural causal effect of Y on
X as the joint effect of all possible interventions p(xjdo(Y~y))
with the additional constraint that the distribution of the
interventions is given by
p(do(Y~y))~p(Y~y): ð5Þ
We can thus separate the definition of the natural causal effect
from variable Y to X into two different criteria. The first one is a
criterion of existence of natural causal effects of y on X (Eq. 2), which
determines when interventions occur naturally in the system. The
second one, is a criterion of maintenance of the natural joint distribution
(Eq. 5), which interprets the observed marginal distribution of the
intervened variable as a distribution of interventions, so that the
natural joint distribution is preserved (Eq. 4).
We now turn to the conditions on the causal structure under
which natural causal effects exist. This means that we need to
identify the conditions for which
p(xjY~y)~p(xjdo(Y~y)), Vy: ð6Þ
In the interventional framework, this condition on the causal effect
on X of intervening Y is called not confounded (Ch. 6 in[10]).
Importantly, the fulfillment or not of this condition is determined
only by the causal structure. In particular, in Supporting
Information S1 we demonstrate that Eq. 6 holds if the following
two conditions are fulfilled: First, that there are no causal
connections in the opposite direction (i.e. from X to Y). Second,
that there is no common driver of X and Y. These two conditions
assure that the dependence reflected in the conditional probability
p(xjY~y) is specific for the causal flow from Y to X. Notice
though, that the presence of mediating variables is allowed, that is,
a natural causal effect can be due to indirect causal connections.
Limits of Causality Analysis
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natural causal effects that are partly indirect.
We emphasize that if Eq. 6 does not hold then the impact on X
of the causal connections from Y to X cannot be given a cause-
and-effect interpretation. An example of this is given in Figure 2B
where Z is a common driver of both X and Y which therefore
precludes a cause-and-effect interpretation of the joint distribution
of X and Y. In this case we can still calculate the causal effect of
an intervention, p(xjdo(Y~y)), according to
p(xjdo(Y~y))~
X
z
p(xjY~y,Z~z)p(Z~z), ð7Þ
see Supporting Information S1 for a detailed calculation. It might
seem contradictory that on the one hand side, the impact of the
causal connections from Y to X does not result in a natural causal
effect and on the other hand side we can still compute the causal
effect of y on X using the above formula. The key here is what we
add by the modifier ‘natural’. To illustrate this, consider what
would happen if we were to reconstruct the joint distribution of X
and Y from the marginal distribution of Y and the distribution of
the interventions given in Eq. 7. That is, consider the joint
distribution
p (x,y) ¼
D p(xjdo(Y~y))p(Y~y),
with the additional constraint that we choose the distribution of
interventions according to Eq. 5. Now given the formula in Eq. 7
we see that p (x,y)=p(x,y) (unless, of course, if p(Z)~p(ZjY),
but this condition is not compatible with Figure 2B, that is, with Z
being a common driver). This means that even if we make sure
that the marginal distribution of Y is the correct one, we cannot
reconstruct the observed natural joint distribution and hence the
natural ’dynamics’ of the variables in the system. In other words,
the interventions change the system and the causal effect is with
respect to this changed system. As mentioned above, sometimes
this is indeed what is desired but in most cases where causality
analysis is applied to the neurosciences the aim is to characterize
what we have called the natural causal effect.
Apart from causal effects of the form p(xjdo(Y~y)), one could
argue that for cases like the one in Figure 2B, it would be relevant
to consider conditional causal effects p(xjZ~z,do(Y~y)). That is,
given that Z is a confounder, a way to get rid of its influence is to
examine the causal effect for each observed value of Z separately.
In analogy with the definition of natural causal effect above we
define the conditional natural causal effect of Y on X given Z~z to be
p(xjY~y,Z~z)p(Y~yjZ~z) ð8Þ
if and only if
p(xjZ~z,Y~y)~p(xjZ~z,do(Y~y)), Vy: ð9Þ
Eq. 9 is analogous to Eq. 2 and constitutes a criterion for the
existence of the conditional natural causal effects. Furthermore, in
Eq. 8 p(Y~yjZ~z) should be interpreted as p(Y~y) in Eq. 5,
being the distribution of the interventions related to the criterion of
maintenance of the natural joint distribution. It is important to
note the different nature of this causal effect with respect to the
unconditional one. In effect, for each value of the conditioned
variable Z there is a (potentially) different natural causal effect of
Y on X. That is, in this case it does not make sense to talk about
the causal effect of Y on X, instead the causal effect is of Y on X
for Z~z. In contrast to the criterion of Eq. 2 this criterion (i.e. Eq.
9) is fulfilled in the causal graph of Figure 2B (see Supporting
Information S1 for the details). We will further address the
interpretation of unconditional and conditional natural causal
effects in a subsequent section below. In Supporting Information
S1 we show the conditions under which Eq. 9 holds. Like for the
unconditional case one of the requirements is that there are no
causal connections in the opposite direction (i.e. from X to Y).
The other condition is analogous to the lack of common drivers in
the unconditional case. In particular, the influence of any possible
common driver should be blocked by the conditioning on the
variables in Z, or in technical language, Z satisfies the back-door
criterion relative to Y and X (see Definition 3.3.1 in [10]).
We have defined the natural causal effect from one (set of)
variables to another as their joint distribution. In practice it will
often be more convenient to characterize the natural causal effect
with a lower-dimensional measure. Below we will indicate some
possible such measures. However, note that the emphasis in this
work is not so much in applying this framework to data but to
show under which conditions the interactions between subsystems
can be given a cause-and-effect interpretation.
Natural causal effects between brain dynamics
Introducing natural causal effects above we considered X and Y to
be univariate or multivariate random variables. In the case of studying
the interactions between different subsystems of the brain we are led to
consider natural causal effects between time series. We assume that
the variables in the time series are causal, that is, the variables in one
time series can potentially have direct causal influence over variables
in the other. Since we are modeling a system (e.g. the brain) without
instantaneous causality, we will not include instantaneous causality in
the models below. (Note that in applications it might be important to
have a high enough sampling rate to avoid ‘instantaneous causality’.)
Given two subsystems X and Y with time changing activities we let
fXg~f...,X{2,X{1,X0,X1,...,Xt,...g and fYg~f...,Y{2,
Y{1,Y0,Y1,...,Yt,...g denote two time series corresponding to
the activities of X and Y. That is, relative to some temporal reference
frame, Xt is the random variable that models the activity in X at
time t.
When asking ‘causality questions’ about time series it is
important to be specific about exactly what is the type of causal
effect of interest. In particular, one could be interested in causal
effects at different scales. For example, the interest could be in the
causal effect of fYg on fXg, which would then be viewed as the
impact of the totality of the causal connections from Y to X.
Indeed, this seem to be the causal effect that has received most
interest in neuroscience (e.g. [8]). Alternatively the interest could
be in the causal effect at a particular point in time, e.g. we could
ask about the causal effect of Yt on Xtz1. Of course, these two
Figure 2. Natural causal effects. Examples of causal graphs
illustrating when the effect of the influence of Y on X can be
interpreted as a natural causal effect (A) and when it cannot (B).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032466.g002
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but are not equivalent and reflect different aspects of the impact of
the causal connections between the subsystems.
We will use the framework of causal graphs to represent the
causal structure of the dynamics of the subsystems. Since we
assume that there is no instantaneous causality, Xt cannot interact
directly with Yt (and vice versa). We use
Xi ¼
D fXi,Xi{1,Xi{2,...g
to denote the past of fXg, relative to time i. Furthermore, for
simplicity we only represent direct causal connections of order 1 in
the causal graph (i.e. from t to tz1), but our results are generic.
The subsystems can be represented at different scales, according
to the type of causal effect one is interested in. We will consider the
case of two subsystems with unidirectional causal connections from
Y to X (Figure 3A–C), or alternatively with bidirectional causal
connections (Figure 3D–F).
The microscopic representation of the causal structure displays
explicitlyallthevariablesandtheircausalconnections(Figures3A,D).
At this microscopic level the graph is always a directed acyclic graph
(DAG), given the above assumption of no instantaneous interactions.
The microscopic level is required to examine types of causal effects
that consider some particular intervals of the time series, e.g.
p(xizk,:::,xijdo(Yjzk’~yjzk’,:::,Yj~yj)). If instead we consider the
time series fXg and fYg in their totality we get the macroscopic causal
graph shown in Figure 3C,F. The macroscopic representation is
useful because of its simplicity, with only one node per system, and it
has been often used in the literature e.g. [20–22]. Note that at the
macroscopic level a microscopic DAG can become cyclic (Figure 3F).
At the macroscopic level the only causal effect to consider is
p(fxgjdo(fYg~fyg)). As one intermediate possibility we could
consider a mesoscopic representation (Figure 3B,E). Here the ‘past’ of
the two time series at some point in time (referred to by Xi and Yi,
respectively) is only implicitly represented, whereas the ‘future’ (Xiz1
and Yiz1) is explicit. The causal effects related to this representation
are of the type p(xiz1jdo(Yi~yi)), and the conditional causal effects
p(xiz1jXi~xi,do(Yi~yi)). As we will see below, this is the
representation that best accommodates Granger causality.
Different levels of representation may be used depending on the
type of causal effects to be studied. However, it is important to
emphasize that the conditions for the existence of natural causal
effects give consistent results independently of the scale of the
representation. For example, whether the natural causal effects
p(fxgjdo(fYg~fyg)) exist or not can be checked using the
microscopic causal graph. This is because the representations at
the different levels are consistent, so that an arrow in the
macroscopic graph from fYg to fXg exists only if any directed
causal connection from Yk to Xk’ exists. This consistency reflects
that at the macroscopic level the time series are conceived, not just
as a set of random variables, but as representative of the dynamics
of the subsystems. While at the microscopic level the status of the
relation of a variable Yk with another Yk’ may seem equivalent to
the one with Xk’’, being this relation determined by the causal
connections, the consideration of the time series as an entity breaks
this equivalence, because the variables Yk and Yk’ can be merged
as part of the time series fYg, while Yk and Xk’’ are not
considered together at the macroscopic level.
At the macroscopic level, the natural causal effect from time
series fYg to fXg is, in analogy with Eq. 3, given by
p(fxg,fyg)~p(fxgjfYg~fyg)p(fYg~fyg)
~p(fxgjdo(fYg~fyg))p(do(fYg~fyg)),
ð10Þ
and can be seen as reflecting the total influence of the dynamics of
the subsystem Y to the dynamics of X. However, as we mentioned
above, this high-dimensional causal effect is not the only type of
causal effects that can result from the causal connections from Y to
X. Other types of causal effects related to distributions of lower
dimension, like the ones mentioned above, also reflect some
aspects of the impact of the causal connections. This diversity of
types of causal effects indicates that the causal structure should be
seen as a medium that channels different types of natural causal
effects. The idea of quantifying causal effects with a single measure
of strength is an oversimplification, and although in some
circumstances focusing on one of these types of natural causal
effects may suffice to characterize the dynamics, in general they
provide us complementary information.
The causal graphs at different scales can be related to different
types of models. Macroscopic causal graphs have been used to
represent structural equation models (SEM), where time is
ignored. This type of models have been described in detail in
the interventional framework of causality (see Chapter 5 in [10]),
but there is no fundamental limitation of this framework to
functional models that do not take time into account. In fact,
sequential time interventions have also been studied (e. g. [23])
and recently the relation between interventions and Granger
causality in time series was considered [24]. See also the so-called
Dynamic structural causal modeling in [14]. Once time is
explicitly represented like in the microscopic scale, the acyclic
structure of the graph is not incompatible with the representation
of feedback loops between the subsystems.
Figure 3. Graphical representation of causal connections for subsystems changing in time. Causal graphs represent two subsystems with
unidirectional causal connections from Y to X (A–C), or bidirectional causal connections (D–F). From left to right the scale of the graphs changes
from a microscopic level, representing the dynamic, to a macroscopic one, in which each subsystem is represented by a single node.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032466.g003
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and characterization of natural causal effects between
dynamics
Here we will consider in more detail when natural causal effects
exist and can be characterized, and thus when the question "What
is the causal effect of the subsystem Y on the subsystem X?" is
meaningful. For simplicity we will restrict ourselves to the bivariate
case illustrated in Figure 3.
Consider first the case of unidirectional causal connections from
Y to X in Figure 3A–C. For any type of causal effect that involves
an intervention of some variables of the time series fYg, generally
p(xizk,:::,xijdo(Yjzk’~yjzk’,:::,Yj~yj)), we need to examine if
they are common drivers between Xizk,:::,Xi and Yjzk’,:::,Yj.
Due to the unidirectional causal connections all the common
drivers are contained in fYg. This means that any conditional
causal effect p(xizk,:::,xijYj~yj,do(Yjzk’~yjzk’,:::,Yj~yj)) is a
natural causal effect. Furthermore, the criterion of existence is also
fulfilled for p(xiz1jdo(Yi~yi)) and p(fxgjdo(fYg~fyg)) (See
Supporting Information S1). In all these cases one can select the
marginal distribution of interventions in agreement with the
natural distribution according to Eq. 5 and thus preserve the
natural joint distribution (Eq. 4). This implies that in the case of
unidirectional causality it is possible to quantify the impact of the
casual connections in terms of the causal effect of Y on X. In the
next section we will indicate how this can be done.
Consider now the case of bidirectional causal connections in
Figure 3D–F. At the microscopic level we see that for Xjz1 and
each variable Yj{k, k§0, the variables Xj{k{k’, k’§1 constitute
common drivers (direct or indirect). This is also reflected in the
mesoscopic time scale, where Xi is a common driver of Xiz1 and
Yi and there is a loop between Xi and Yi. Therefore, the criterion
of existence of the natural causal effects is not fulfilled in the case of
bidirectional causality.
By contrast, the criterion of existenceis fulfilled for the conditional
natural causal effects, for example p(xiz1jXi~xi,do(Yi~yi)) that
we mentioned when we introduced the mesoscopic level. In this case
all the possible common drivers, contained in Xi, are conditioned.
Thereforewe can say that there areconditional naturalcausal effects
from Yi to Xiz1 given Xi even in the case of bidirectional causality.
However,todetermineifthistypeofconditionalcausaleffectscanbe
used to characterize the impact of the causal connections from Y to
X, we still have to consider the preservation of the joint conditional
distribution (Eq. 8). In analogy to Eq. 5, to preserve the natural
dynamics we need to select the interventions according to
p(do(Yi~yi)jXi~xi)~p(Yi~yijXi~xi): ð11Þ
That is, we have to choose the interventions conditionally upon
Xi, but this is clearly contradictory to the idea of defining a causal
effect from Y to X. Since Xi conditions the interventions, we
cannot interpret the causal effect as representative of the impact of
the causal connections from one subsystem to the other. This is
because we do not simply consider the conditional effect of a set of
variables Yi in a variable Xiz1 given a another set of variables Xi.
The variables Xiz1 and Xi are related since we consider them as
part of a single entity, namely the time series fXg. The conditional
natural causal effects p(xiz1jXi~xi,do(Yi~Yi)) with a distribu-
tion according to Eq. 11 occur given how the causal connections
generate the observed dynamics, but these conditional causal
effects cannot be understood as being from one subsystem to the
other. In particular, the distribution of the natural interventions is
also determined by the causal connections from X to Y.
Altogether, in the case of bidirectional causality, none of the
candidate causal effects considered fulfills the criteria for the
existence of natural causal effects and the maintenance of the joint
distribution. For bidirectional causality the causal effects like
p(xiz1jdo(Yi)~yi) and p(fxgjdo(fYg~fyg)) do not exist as
natural causal effects, while conditional causal effects like
p(xiz1jXi~xi,do(Yi)~yi) take place in the system, but cannot
be understood as causal effects between the subsystems.
We emphasize that what prevents the interpretation of the
conditional natural causal effects discussed above as a causal effect
between the subsystems is to some extent the point-of-view of the
interpreter. What our analysis show is that problems of
interpretation arises when grouping variables together as when
considering fXg as standing for the activity of a particular
subsystem. At the microscopic level, keeping time locality, one can
analyze these conditional natural causal effects. For example,
p(xiz1jXi~x,do(Yi~y)) can be viewed the natural causal effect
of Yi~y on Xiz1 given Xi~x. That is, relative to a particular
time instant, we can meaningfully talk about conditional natural
causal effects. However, note that since Yi does not represent the
dynamics of Y, this natural causal effect cannot be considered the
effect of Y on X.
That we cannot in general answer what is the causal effect of a
brain subsystem on another while processing some stimulus or
performing some neural computation may seem surprising.
However, the definition of the natural causal effects (Eq. 3) was
derived precisely to be consistent with what should be expected
from a definition of causal effect to be used to analyze the natural
activity of brain dynamics. We will now give some arguments to
indicate that the restrictions imposed by the causal structure are in
fact intuitive.
In Figure 3 we showed that, while at the microscopic scale a
DAG is obtained as long as instantaneous interactions are
excluded, at the mesoscopic and macroscopic scales the existence
of bidirectional causality leads to a cyclic graph (Figure 3E–F).
This means that Xi and Yi are mutually determined. This mutual
determination can be understood as the impossibility to write a set
of equations such that the dynamics of Y can be determined
previously without simultaneously determining the dynamics of X.
At the microscopic scale, for bidirectional causality (Figure 3D),
one can consider a path from some node Yi{r, rw0,t oXiz1
which is directed and thus follows the causal flow, but contains
both arrows Yi{k?Xi{kz1 and Xi{k’?Yi{k’z1. In this case it is
not possible to disentangle in the natural dynamics the causal effect
in the opposite directions: when considering the causal effect from
Y to X, assuming k’wk, it is not clear to which degree the
influence of Y on X is intrinsic to Y or due to the previous
influence of X on Y.
That is, in the case of a bidirectional coupling, X and Y form a
unique bivariate system in which the contribution of one system to
the dynamics of the other cannot be meaningfully quantified.
Therefore it does not make sense to ask for the causal effect from
one subsystem to the other, but to examine how the causal
connections participate in the generation of the joint dynamics. A
simple neural example illustrating this view would be the
processing of a visual stimulus in the primary visual cortex (V1).
For example, responses of V1 cells are influenced by the spatial
context of the the stimulus due to the feedback projection from
cortical area MT (V5), where receptive fields are much larger than
in V1. This means that there is a feedback modulation from a
higher level in the visual pathway, which activity depends itself on
the processing in V1 [25]. In this case what is important is to
understand how the causal structure, and in particular the
existence of the feedback causal connections, are necessary to
Limits of Causality Analysis
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 March 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 3 | e32466generate the regime of the responses and to obtain some
characteristics of the neurons’ responses that are functionally
relevant, like the influence of stimulus context.
The analysis of causal effects
We have complemented the definition of causal effects from the
interventional framework with two criteria that reflect the
requirements specific for studying causality between subsystems
of the brain during their natural activity. In this section we
consider how to quantify the natural causal effects between
dynamics and more generally any causal effect related to a change
in the dynamics. The measures introduced below should be
considered devices for further analysis and characterization of
natural causal effects and not necessarily as tools for data analysis.
We start by considering how to quantify single causal effects of a
given type, for example p(xjdo(Y~y)) for a fixed intervention
Y~y. Assume that we check in a causal structure that this type of
natural causal effects exists. To quantify this causal effect we need
a reference distribution to which the post-intervention distribution
can be compared. The appropriate reference distribution will
typically be dictated by the context. For example, in Eq. 1 the
reference was the marginal distribution p(x), which is just the
average over all interventions. Alternatively, one can consider the
same intervention Y~y but for a different configuration of the
system, in which some causal mechanisms are assumed to have
changed. In this latter case we denote the reference distribution
p (xjdo(Y~y)). Notice that even when a type of natural causal
effects exists and thus the impact of the causal connection from Y
to X can be interpreted in terms of cause-and-effects, one typically
cannot quantify the causal effects in absolute terms. Only in some
special cases, when the reference distribution can be associated
with the absence of causal interactions, can the causal effect be
interpreted in absolute terms. In this case, and only in this case,
can we talk of the strength of the causal effect. In the general case,
the measures we consider here reflect relative differences of the
causal effects.
Our analysis of natural causal effects relies on the comparison of
probability distributions but we emphasize that the first step in the
analysis must be to make sure that the type of natural causal effects
studied actually exists in the system. To compare two probability
distributions associated with natural causal effects one can use
different measures, as for example the expected values as in Eq. 1.
Here we will use Kullback-Leibler divergences (see Methods) since
these are sensitive to all the moments of the distributions and also
because this allows for a more direct comparison with a general
measure of Granger causality, the transfer entropy (see below). For
example, in the case that the same intervention for another
configuration is used as a reference we can use:
KL(p (xjY~y);p(xjY~y))~
P
x
p (xjY~y)log
p (xjY~y)
p(xjY~y)
:
ð12Þ
Here we have assumed that the domain of X is the same in the two
configurations. When this is not the case, Jensen-Shannon
Divergence should be used instead (see Methods). The Kullback-
Leibler divergence KL(p(x);q(x)) is an asymmetric measure that
quantifies how different q(x) is from p(x).I fp (xjY~y)
corresponds to the reference distribution associated with no causal
interactions, the particular form of Eq. 12 enables an absolute
comparison of natural casual effects for different configurations.
Note, however, that we are not interested in characterizing a
particular measure but in examining the principles of the analysis
of natural causal effects. The particular measure selected for
application to data should also depend on other issues such as the
balance between the degree of sensitivity to differences between
the distributions (i. e. linear vs. nonlinear measures), and the
difficulty to estimate the measures from limited amount of data.
We now consider how to quantify the natural causal effects in a
system, when different causal effects of the same type have to be
taken into account. As discussed previously, the impact of causal
connections does not depend on single interventions, but on all the
different natural causal effects of the same type occurring in the
dynamics with a given probability distribution. How to proceed to
compare these different natural causal effects depends on the
purpose of the analysis. For example, one may be interested in
quantifying the average difference of the natural causal effects for
two different configurations. In this case one can use the
probability of the natural intervention (Eq. 5) to average Eq. 12.
That is, one could use
E½KL(p (xjY~y);p(xjY~y)) ~
P
y
p (y)
P
x
p (xjY~y)log
p (xjY~y)
p(xjY~y)
:
ð13Þ
This analysis can be done indistinctively of which type of
natural causal effects is analyzed. For processes one can substitute
p(xjdo(Y~y)) by for example p(xiz1jdo(Yi~yi)) in Eqs. 12 and
13. Again the requirement for these measures to be interpreted as
quantifying the natural causal effects between the processes is that
the criteria discussed above are fulfilled.
How Dynamic Causal Modeling and Granger causality
answer the questions about causality
We will now review how the three different questions about
causality introduced above are addressed by DCM and Granger
causality, the two main approaches that are commonly applied to
study causality between the brain systems. Although this section is
not strictly a ‘Results’ section, casting DCM and Granger
Causality in terms of the framework we propose will make it
possible to see (in the next section) how our work extends and
complements these approaches. Before examining DCM and
Granger causality separately, we should note that both have in
common that they rely on the statistical analysis of observational
data. Both are thus ultimately limited by the existence of
observationally equivalent causal structures with regard to the
inference of the causal connections (question Q1 about existence).
Here we will not consider these limitations further but instead
focus on how DCM and Granger causality address question Q3
about the quantification of causal effects. We will focus on the
essential aspects of these approaches as formulated by [26] and
[27], respectively.
Dynamic Causal Modeling is based on modeling the observed
data, and from our perspective it can be considered an approach
to answering Q2. Since DCM explicitly considers the dynamics, in
contrast to previous modeling approaches such as SEM, it
represents an important step towards obtaining a model that can
faithfully reflect the causal structure and the dynamics of the real
system. Similarly, since it considers a forward model that maps
hidden states to observed quantities it also is an improvement with
respect to the approaches based on the parametric autoregressive
model formulation of Granger causality [28]. In DCMs the state
equations are causal in the sense that the rate of change of the
variables generally depends on the state of the system. This means
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from the state equations. The form of the state equations in DCM
makes an interventional interpretation of the model possible due to
the asymmetry between the left- and right-hand terms in the
equations [14]. Nonetheless, the correspondence of the inherent
causal relationships in the model to the causal structure of the real
system depends critically on how accurate the state equations
model the underlying neuronal activity. With regard to Q1 it
remains as an open question how realistic a model should be so
that the causal structure of the system can be inferred correctly.
Furthermore, in practice, since typically only few subsystems are
modeled, latent variables are certainly present and could introduce
‘‘spurious causality’’, for example making two subsystem appear
causally related whereas in fact they are not (see [29] and [14] for
discussion of the missing region problem in the concrete context of
fMRI analysis). This is the ultimate limitation when inferring
causality without intervening mentioned above.
We are here mainly interested in how DCM addresses question
Q3 about the causal effects. Effective connectivity is generally
understood as the influence one region exerts over another [8]. In
practice though, this abstract definition is made concrete
considering that the effective connectivity is associated with the
coupling parameters between variables representing different
brain regions in the state equations [26]. For example, for two
different conditions, a model is fitted and the gain of the coupling
parameter that models the connectivity from region Y to region X
is reported. Therefore, the strength of the causal connection is
analyzed in terms of the coupling parameters in the model. There
is no explicit definition of the causal effect. The change in the
coupling parameter is discussed in terms of adaptation or stimulus
modulation of the connectivity, thus focusing on the mechanistic
change, without considering its impact in the dynamics. In some
simple cases, such as when the state dynamics are linear, one can
infer interventional causal effects from the model parameters [14].
However, it is important to emphasize that a functional (or
biophysical) model (dynamic or not) of the real system does not
alleviate the restrictions with respect to natural causal effect
imposed by the causal structure. In other words, if a particular
causal structure is incompatible with a natural causal effect from Y
to X the values of parameters describing the coupling from Y to X
can not be interpreted as reflecting the causal effect of Y on X in
the natural dynamics, even if they are informative about what
would be the causal effect of an external intervention of Y on X.
The approach of Granger causality is significantly different from
the one of DCM. Many years ago Sir Clive Granger suggested a
criterion for testing for causality between time series [28]. In the
bivariate case, this criterion says that there are no causal
connections from process Y to process X if and only if
p(xiz1jXi~xi)~p(xiz1jXi~xi,Yi~yi), ð14Þ
where Xi, Yi refer to the whole past of X and Y, respectively. In
words, Y is causing X if the future of X given the past of X is not
independent of the past of Y. Therefore the criterion of Granger
causality tests for a conditional independence, which corresponds
to the type of constraints we mentioned above that the causal
structure imposes on the statistical dependencies. Given that these
constraints are generally not enough to infer the causal structure
the criterion of Granger causality is only applicable under some
assumptions. We will called these assumptions complete observability.
What is assumed is that there is no hidden process which is a
common driver of X and Y. This assumption is related to the
fundamental limitations of causality inference from observational
data and is common to DCM. Furthermore it is assumed that we
have access to the relevant processes between which the causal
connections exist, so that the probability distributions are
estimated for variables directly corresponding to these processes.
This assumption avoids the use of a forward model that maps
hidden states to observed quantities. This second assumption is
specific of Granger causality in contrast to DCM where such a
forward model is explicitly included.
In the original formulation, Granger used the mean of the
distributions to test the above equality, but it was clear to him that
other measures could be used as well [27]. The most general test of
the equality of the two probability distributions in Equation 14
uses the Kullback-Leibler divergence (See Methods). The resulting
measure has been introduced several times in the past and in
different contexts [30–32]. Most recently, the same measure was
re-introduced under the name ‘transfer entropy’ [33] and due to
its recent popularity, we will use this name in the sequel. See e.g.
[14,34] for a more detailed description of how different
formulations of Granger causality appeared in different fields
and for different types of processes. In particular we can formulate
Granger’s causality criterion (Eq. 14) as a comparison between
p(xiz1jXi~xi,Yi~yi) and p(xiz1jXi~xi) using the KL diver-
gence. The transfer entropy from Y to X is:
TY?X ¼
D P
xiyi
p(xi,yi)
P
xiz1
p(xiz1jxi,yi)log
p(xiz1jxi,yi)
p(xiz1jxi)
: ð15Þ
Note that due to a basic property of the KL-divergence the
transfer entropy is zero if and only if the criterion of Eq. 14 is
fulfilled.
We now consider how Granger causality analysis addresses the
different questions about causality. Since it provides a criterion to
infer the existence of the causal connections it focuses on
answering Q1. However, notice that the Granger causality
criterion is not designed to infer a causal graph that considers
explicitly the temporal dynamics (the microscopic scale in
Figure 3). The Granger causality criterion only intends to infer if
there is any causal connection from Y to X, that is, allows us to
construct the macroscopic causal graph.
Granger causality is based on a criterion for causal inference
and thus in its more general nonparametric formulation does not
involve modeling, so that question Q2 is not addressed. The
transfer entropy constitutes the most general measure to test for
the criterion of Granger causality. This means that theoretically a
nonzero TY?X implies the existence of some causal connection
from Y to X, thus answering Q1 (if the assumption of observability
are fulfilled). In practice, one needs a way to assess the significance
of the nonzero value and in general bootstrapping or surrogates
are needed (e. g. [5,35,36]). If instead of transfer entropy the
parametric formulation using linear autoregressive models is
applied, one could consider that question Q2 is also addressed
but this means assuming that the autoregressive model is realistic
enough to reflect the causal mechanisms.
Regarding Q3, the same statistic used to test for causality is
commonly used to quantify the strength of the causal connections.
For example, Granger (1963) [37] refers to the Granger causality
measure for linear Gaussian processes as the strength of the causality
from Y to X. This idea of strength suggests that, apart from
assessing the significance of a nonzero value, one should use the
value of the statistic for quantification. As for DCM, there is no
explicit definition of what the causal effects are. However, in
Granger causality, the causal effect is quantified taking into
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changes of single coupling parameters. The emphasis is put on the
impact of the causal connections on the dynamics of the processes,
so that the causal effects are implicitly conceived as a result of how
the causal connections participate in the generation of such
dynamics.
Our definition of natural causaleffects between processesis closer
to this implicit notion of causal effects used in Granger causality,
since it also considers the impact of the causal connections on the
dynamics, in contrast to DCM that compares coupling parameters
of the model. However, we also argued that this impact cannot be
captured with a single measure of strength. Oppositely, the causal
structure results in different types of natural causal effects going on
in the dynamics, which are associated with different aspects of how
the dynamics arise from the causal structure.
Furthermore, the constraints for the existence of natural causal
effects, that for example determine that natural causal effects
between processes do not occur in bidirectionally coupled bivariate
systems, are contradictory with the common practice of comparing
the causal effect in both directions e.g. [6,38–42] when applying the
Granger causality analysis. It can be shown that this contradiction is
due to a misuse of Granger causality measures and in particular of
transfer entropy as measures of causal strength [43]. A detailed
description of why transfer entropy cannot be generally used for the
quantification of causal effects and under which conditions it has a
meaningful interpretation in terms of natural causal effects is left for
a future contribution. We will next discuss to which degree the
analysis of causal effects we propose should be considered as
complementary or substitutive of DCM and Granger causality.
How to combine the analysis of natural causal effects
with Dynamic Causal Modeling and Granger causality
The approach we proposed for the quantification of natural
causal effects should be used instead of Granger causality measures
to address the question of quantification (Q3). This means that the
transfer entropy should be only used as a statistic to test the
existence of the causal interactions based on the general criterion
of Granger causality (Eq. 14). Even for inference one should be
aware of the strong limitations imposed by the assumption of
complete observability. In the interventional framework the
limitations of Granger causality and thus transfer entropy to infer
the causal structure without complete observability are well
known. Alternative measures of information flow have been
proposed [17] and compared to transfer entropy [43].
Although the value of the transfer entropy cannot be used as a
measure of strength of the causal effects under some conditions
that depend on the causal structure it quantifies the information
transfer from one process to another [43], while more generally it
can still be used to characterize the temporal statistical
dependencies in the signals. Bressler and Seth (2010) [44]
distinguished between effective connectivity [8] and a different concept
of causal connectivity. While the effective connectivity is expected to
reflect the causal influence one brain area exerts on another, causal
connectivity is considered more pragmatically as a description of
directed dynamical interdependencies present in the recorded
signals. Although using the term causal can be misleading in this
context, the transfer entropy, considered strictly as a statistical
measure, has a rigorous meaning in terms of information loss [45]
and can capture aspects of the dynamics which may be less
reflected in symmetric measures (like coherence or symmetric
mutual information). Therefore, the type of analysis related to Eqs.
12 and 13 should substitute Granger causality to analyze causal
effects in the natural dynamics, but it is complementary to the use
of transfer entropy as a measure of information loss.
Our approach is also complementary to Dynamic Causal
Modeling: it can be used to examine the dynamic impact of the
changes across conditions of the coupling parameters associated
with effective connectivity. In particular, the only thing specific for
the analysis of natural causal effects in Eq. 12 is the selection of
probability distributions that are associated with natural causal
effects. Alternatively, one can relate the two compared configu-
rations to a change in a coupling parameter. The comparison of a
particular probability distribution across configurations (not
necessarily associated with natural causal effects) shows the impact
of this change on a particular aspect of the dynamics. For example,
one can compare p(xi) when a coupling parameter associated with
the strength of the causal connection from Y to X changes:
KL(p (xi);p(xi))~
X
xi
p (xi)log
p (xi)
p(xi)
: ð16Þ
This change of a coupling parameter can be seen exactly as a
punctual intervention. Although in causal graphs associated with
the state equations of a DCM model, the coupling parameters do
not appear as nodes, if two alternative models are compared they
can be merged in a single model where the parameter can be seen
as a binary variable, so that choosing one or the other model is
equivalent to intervening this variable to one of the values.
Therefore the comparison of a particular type of probability
distributions like in Eq. 16 quantifies the causal effect of the
change in the coupling parameter. This type of causal effect is not
a natural causal effect from one brain subsystem to another that
occur as part of the generation of the dynamics; it is the causal
effect that a change in the mechanisms has on some aspects of the
dynamics related to the probability distributions chosen. Also here
there is flexibility to examine different aspects of the dynamics
selecting different probability distributions, for example p(xi),o r
p(xiz1jXi~xi), in the same way that the natural causal effects
from Y to X are studied examining different distributions like
p(xiz1jYi~yi) or p(fxgjfYg~fyg). This type of analysis
complements the direct comparison of the coupling parameters
(effective connectivity) because it is not obvious without actually
examining the distributions to derive how a change in the
parameters affects the dynamics.
DCM addresses question Q2 about the mechanisms aiming to
provide a realistic model of how the dynamics are generated. In
this regard, the analysis of the causal effects considered above
cannot substitute the DCM approach. However, considering that
only in some cases the natural causal effects between brain regions
exist helps to bound the meaning of effective connectivity,
generally understood as the influence one region exert on another.
The coupling parameters can be related to causal effects of
external interventions [14] but do not quantify natural causal
effects occurring in the recorded dynamics. Furthermore, the
analysis we suggested above can straightforwardly be extended to
examine the causal effect of a change in a coupling parameter on
some aspects of the dynamics, something which is not easy to
evaluate from the comparison of the coupling parameters across
conditions. We will illustrate this point further when analyzing
causal effects in an example system below.
Testing for causality and analyzing causal effects in a
simple model
We now examine a model system to illustrate the distinction
between the inference of causality and the analysis of the causal
effects. Here we focus on a simple example of a stationary Markov
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linear Gaussian stationary stochastic processes. We note that in
these examples all the measures used are calculated analytically
(see Methods) to isolate the fundamental properties of the
measures from issues related to estimation from data. We consider
the transfer entropy TY?X and two measures related to Eqs. 13
and 16, respectively. In particular, instead of the Kullback-Leibler
divergence used in these equations we calculate the Jensen-
Shannon Divergence (JSD) (see Methods), since it is well defined
for probabilities with different domains, as the ones resulting from
the Markov process explained below.
So consider a stationary bivariate Markov binary process of
order 1. Both X and Y take only values 0 and 1. The process is
completely determined by the transition probabilities and by the
condition of stationarity:
p(xiz1,yiz1)~
X
xi,yi
p(xiz1,yiz1jxi,yi)p(xi,yi): ð17Þ
Furthermore,weassumethat onlyunidirectionalcausalconnections
from Y to X exist. Accordingly, the transition probabilities can be
separated as the product p(xiz1,yiz1jxi,yi)~p(xiz1jxi,yi)
p(yiz1jyi). In particular, we let the transition probabilities for Y
be p(Yiz1~yjYi~y)~d,t h a ti s ,d is the probability that the same
value is taken at subsequent steps. The transition probabilities for X
are such that p(Xiz1~yjYi~y)~
1zg
2
, independently of the
value of Xi. Therefore g determines the strength of the connection
from Yi to Xiz1, and there is a causal connection from Y to X for
gw0. For g~0, Xiz1 takes value 0 or 1 with equal probability and
independently of Xi and Yi. In the case d~0,w h e nY
deterministically alternates between 0 and 1, this example
corresponds to one already discussed in Kaiser and Schreiber
(2002) [46]. Here we present results for nonzero values of d with
different degree of stochasticity. We calculate the measures using 3
time lags for the past Xi and Yi, since this is enough for
convergence and for higher lags the values obtained do not differ
significantly. In fact, given that causal connections are only of order
1, one time lag is enough when conditioning on Yi. However, since
in the transfer entropy (Eq. 15) the conditional entropy H(Xiz1jXi)
appears, where there is no conditioning on Yi, one has to consider
all the information about Yi that exists in the past Xi.
First we examine how the transfer entropy TY?X depends on g
and d (Figure 4A). Supporting its use for the inference of causality
from Y to X, the transfer entropy TY?X is zero if and only if g~0.
In the opposite direction TX?Y is always zero for this example
(results not shown). In the Granger causality approach the transfer
entropy is used also as a measure of the strength of the causal
connection. From the Figure it is clear that the relation between
the coupling parameter g and TY?X depends strongly on d.I n
fact, for low values of d, TY?X is nonmonotonic with g. In words,
the Granger causality measure is nonmonotonic with the
parameter that determines the strength of the connection. This
can be understood taking into account that transfer entropy
quantifies the extra reduction of uncertainty that results from
considering the past of Y after considering the past of X. For low d
the dynamics of Y are almost deterministic, and thus when g
increases the dynamics of X become also more and more
deterministic. For such, almost deterministic, dynamics the
remaining uncertainty of Xiz1 after conditioning on Xi is already
very small, and thus the extra reduction given Yi decreases with
high g. In fact, for the extreme values d~0,1 (Y completely
deterministic), the nonmonotonicity leads to TY?X~0 for g~1 -
see Figure 1 in Kaiser and Schreiber (2002) [46]. In such extreme
cases transfer entropy cannot be used even to infer causal
interactions. In fact, this limitation of transfer entropy in the
inference of causality for strongly synchronized systems is well
known e.g. [17,47,48].
In Figure 4B we show the Jensen-Shannon Divergence (JSD) for
distributions of the type p(xiz1jYi~yi). Since there is only
unidirectional causality from Y to X this distribution fulfills the
criterion of existence for natural causal effects (Eq. 2), and thus the
JSD can be used to quantify the changes in the natural causal effects
from Y to X when g changes. This corresponds to the type of
analysis described in relation to Eq. 13. Here the different
configurations are identified by the value of g. In particular we
take the distribution p(xiz1jYi~yi) obtained for g~0, for which
there is no causal connection, as a reference to compare the natural
causal effects to. Notice that for this Markov process, since by
constructionthereisno causalconnectionfrom Xi to Xiz1, wehave
that p(xiz1jYi~yi)~p(xiz1jXi~xi,Yi~yi). This means that the
Figure 4. Causality analysis in a binary Markov process. Information theoretic measures used for the inference of causality and the analysis of
causal effects calculated for a bivariate binary stationary Markov process of order 1. See the text for a description of the process. The measures are
calculated analytically using 3 time lags to account for the past Xi and Yi. The results are shown for d~1=2 (blue), d~1=15 (green), and d~1=100
(red), where d is the probability that Yiz1~Yi. A: Transfer entropy TY?X (Eq. 15). B: Jensen-Shannon divergence JSD(p (xiz1jyi),p(xiz1jyi)) (Eq. 21).
C: Jensen-Shannon divergence JSD(p (xi),p(xi)).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032466.g004
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appearing in the numerator of the logarithm in the definition of the
transfer entropy (Eq. 15). What is different with respect to the
transferentropyisthe probabilitydistributionused asa referencefor
comparison. Now the natural causal effects are compared across
configurations. We see that the changes in the natural causal effect
p(xiz1jYi~yi) monotonically increase with g and are independent
of d. The independence of d results from the particular generation
of the process, since p(Yi~0)~p(Yi~1)~
1
2
independently of d
and since the causal interactions are of order 1 we have that
p(xiz1jYi~yi)~p(xiz1jYi~yi). The monotonic divergence with
respect to the distribution obtained for g~0 demonstrating that in
this case there is a monotonic relation between g (the strength of the
connection), and the impact of the causal connection (the natural
causal effects). This should be contrasted to the results using transfer
entropy described above.
In Figure 4C we show the Jensen-Shannon divergences for
distributions of the type p(xi) (Eq. 16). In contrast to the
probability distributions p(xiz1jYi~yi), these distributions do
not represent a natural causal effect that occurs in the dynamics.
However, since the change of g can be seen in itself as an external
intervention of the system, we can compare p(xi) in dependence
on g as a way to quantify the causal effect of this change in the
model. As before we take as a reference the distribution obtained
for g~0. For d=1=2, JSD(p (xi),p(xi)) increases monotonically
with g indicating that an increase in the strength of the connection
renders the distributions more different. However, for d~1=2 a
constant zero value is obtained. Importantly, this should not be
seen as a limitation of JSD(p (xi);p(xi)) to quantify the causal
effect, on the contrary it indicates that, with respect to the
distribution p(xi), the changes in the effective connectivity (g) have
no effect for d~1=2. This illustrates how focusing on the value of
a coupling parameter may be insufficient in order to describe the
impact that a change has in a particular aspect of the dynamics.
Discussion
In this work we have analyzed the applicability of the cause-
and-effect framework to the study of natural dynamics of systems
consisting of interacting subsystems. Our main result is that it is
generally not possible to characterize the effects of the interactions
for each subsystem separately. That is, the effect of causal
interactions can typically not be described in terms of the effect of
one subsystem over another. Rather, the interactions unifies the
subsystems and creates a dynamics that transcends the limits posed
by the individual systems. This result is generic in the sense that it
only depends on the causal structure (i.e. on the topology of the
causal connections) and not on the details of the system under
study. Our work suggests that analyzing the effect of interactions in
the natural dynamics in terms of cause-and-effect is of limited use,
in particular in systems where the functional units tend to be
heavily interconnected, such as the brain. We emphasize that our
contribution should not be seen as a new method to substitute
other approaches to causal analysis. The conditions of existence of
natural causal effects indicate that inference of causal connections
and analysis of causal influences should be considered different
types of analysis with different requirements. When natural causal
effects do not exist, they can not be quantified, no matter what
measure is used. Our analysis therefore has important implications
for all approaches aiming at characterizing the effects of causal
interactions in the unperturbed system. We will now discuss our
work in more detail and relate it to some previous work in the
literature.
It might be helpful to first interpret our main result in the light
of the three questions about causality introduced above. First, the
existence of a causal connection from Y to X can always be
probed. This is possible even if there are causal connections also
from X to Y. The ‘traditional’ way to do this is through
interventions, that is by actively perturbing the Y system. We
pointed out that, under certain assumptions, Granger causality
and DCM can be used to infer existence of causal connections
from observational data. Second, the mechanisms by which these
causal connections are instantiated can always be probed (at least
in principle) by modeling the systems at the appropriate level. We
note that interventions could play an important role also in this
case. Indeed to constrain and corroborate the models, interven-
tions might be very useful. Third, and this is our main result, the
effect of the interactions naturally happening in the system can
typically not be described as the effect of Y over X (or vice versa).
Here, and this is a central point, interventions cannot be used (not
even in principle) to quantify the effect of Y on X in the natural
dynamics, unless they quantify a natural causal effect. Moreover,
in this case our work shows the importance of using interventions
that mimic the natural dynamics as closely as possible. Our results
demonstrate that the quantification of causal interactions is a
question separate from the other two questions and that it might
not always be well defined.
Central to our results is the notion of a natural causal effect. This
should be considered an adaptation of the interventional
framework of causality [10] to the context of dynamically
interacting subsystems. Whereas most work in the interventional
framework focuses on causal effects resulting from external
interventions, to study the unperturbed system we need a notion
of causal effects from one subsystem to another related to the
natural dynamics. A natural causal effect can be seen as a result of
a naturally occurring intervention. In general, in the natural
dynamics, different natural interventions of the same type occur
with different probability. This led us to define the natural causal
effect between variables as the observed joint distribution, and to
consider a distribution of natural interventions determined by the
marginal distribution of the intervened variable. Furthermore, we
pointed out that there is no unique type of natural causal effect
that can be used to study the impact of the causal connections
between subsystems. Rather the causal structure constitutes a
medium in which multiple types of natural causal effects arise.
The existence of natural causal effects and the maintenance of
the natural joint distribution determine when the question about
what is the causal effect from one subsystem to another in the
natural dynamics is well-defined. This is in contrast to the question
about the causal effect of an external intervention of one subsystem
on another, which is not constrained by these criteria. We
examined when these criteria are fulfilled in the case of two
subsystems. We showed that natural causal effects from Y to X are
well-defined if unidirectional causal connections from Y to X exist,
but not in the case of bidirectional causality. Furthermore, our
results indicate that some types of conditional natural causal effects
exist even if the impact of the causal connections between the
subsystems Y and X cannot be mutually disentangled. This is
because they are defined based on an explicit consideration of time
locality and are not compatible with the view of subsystems as
macroscopic entities. In general the fulfillment of the criterion of
existence depends on the causal structure (see Supporting
Information S1). This means that only under quite restrictive
conditions the natural causal effects exist and can be used to
characterize the impact of the causal connections from one to
another subsystem in the natural dynamics. A detailed analysis of
multivariate systems remains for a future contribution but it is
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limited in the case of more than two interacting systems. Notice
that this limitation is of a fundamental nature, since it refers to the
existence of the natural causal effects in the natural dynamics. This
is in contrast to other limitations which are more of a practical
nature, like the existence of hidden states for the inference
causality [10], or computational time for model comparison [49].
We considered how the most used approaches to study causality
in the brain address the three questions about causality and how
compatible they are with the concept of natural causal effects.
Granger causality should be seen as a criterion to infer the
existence of causal connections between processes that is valid
under the quite strong conditions of complete observability.
However, Granger causality measures, including transfer entropy,
cannot be used in general to quantify causal effects. The existence
of a particular type of natural causal effects depends on the causal
structure, and only when the causal effect exists a measure of its
strength can be meaningful. Even when a type of natural causal
effects exists and can be used for the characterization of the impact
of the causal connection from Y to X it only makes sense to
consider the strength of the causal effects when one can compare
to a configuration that corresponds to the case of no causality from
Y to X.
We also introduced the idea of analyzing natural causal effects
by comparing them across different configurations, i.e. different
regimes of the same system (model). This approach was illustrated
in a simple example system where the measures could be
calculated analytically. Importantly, this type of comparison is
not only useful to compare natural causal effects. When the
different configurations are related to a change in the causal
mechanism, comparing a particular type of probability distribu-
tion allows us to examine the impact of this change on the aspect
of the dynamics captured by the probability distribution.
Accordingly, the analysis of causal effects, which necessarily
requires considering the dynamics of the system, complements the
usual way in which Dynamic Causal Modeling is used to examine
changes in the coupling parameters. The impact of these changes
for some aspect of the dynamics is not easy to predict just from the
form of the model, as was shown in the example.
The distinction between on the one hand the inference of causal
connections and the modeling of causal mechanisms and on the
other hand the analysis of causal effects is tightly related to the
distinction between model fitting and model analysis. For example,
in DCM it is common practice to fit a model for different
configurations (that can correspond to different experimental
settings related to different tasks) and then examine the gain in
some coupling parameters associated with effective connectivity.
Although this structural comparison is a first step for model
comparison, this comparison should also involve comparing the
dynamics that result from them. When meaningful given the
causal structure, one can analyze the natural causal effects from
one subsystem to another. More generally, even when it is not
possible to disentangle the impact of the causal connections from
Y to X from the ones in the opposite direction and thus the
subsystems are not separable, still the causal connections
determine the generation of the joint dynamics. This means that
in general the analysis of the impact of the causal connections
cannot be formulated only in terms of causal effects from one part
of the system on another, but examining the emergence of some
properties of the dynamics. For example, it is well known that
causal connections between two intrinsically non-oscillatory units
can make them oscillate synchronously (e.g. [50]). That is,
increasing the coupling leads to a qualitative change in the
dynamics.
A conclusion from our work is that the notion of causal effects
between subsystems might not be very useful in neuroscience.
Given the ubiquitous existence of feedback and recurrent
connections, the criterion for the existence of natural causal
effects can hardly be fulfilled when analyzing neural data.
Furthermore, it has been widely studied that these connections
play important roles determining properties of the dynamics which
are functionally relevant e.g. [25,51]. Therefore, the impact of the
causal connections in the brain is generally not related to causal
effects from one subsystem to another. Even when considering the
effect of an external sensory stimulus, which is closer to an external
intervention, one is not interested on the impact of this
intervention per se, but in which way the brain is capable of
encoding and decoding the sensory information. This perspective
follows the idea suggested by [52] that, regarding the neural code
and neural computations, statistical dependencies are more
relevant than causal effects. In the same line [43] illustrated that
while a measure of causality based on interventions [17] can be
informative about the causal structure when the transfer entropy
provides erroneous information about it, the transfer entropy, as a
measure of statistical dependence quantifying the extra reduction
in uncertainty when considering the past of the other process, is in
general more informative about the computational properties of
the system. This means that in fact, when the transfer entropy is
used to study causal interactions between brain regions from
experimental data e.g. [6,38–42], or neural models e.g. [53–55], it
may be not only more correct but also more useful to interpret this
measure not in terms of the strength of causality but as a measure
of statistical dependence. Furthermore the transfer entropy is
connected to the mutual information rate [56,57] and under some
conditions it quantifies information transfer [43].
Pearl’s interventional approach to causality constitutes a
unifying framework that relates different approaches to causal
analysis like counterfactual analysis [9] and structural equation
modeling [58]. However, the consideration of sequential inter-
ventions [23] or time series is less common in the interventional
framework. Only recently the link between Granger causality and
the effect of interventions has been examined [24] in detail. Also
for Dynamic Causal Modeling the interpretation of the coefficients
in a bilinear model in terms of single external interventions has
recently been pointed out [14]. Examining the way in which this
general approach is compatible with the aims of studying causal
effects between brain subsystems helped us to clarify when it is
meaningful to ask for the causal effect from one brain subsystem to
another, and to distinguish what type of information this analysis
provide us in comparison to the inference of causal connections or
the analysis of dynamic statistical dependencies between the
subsystems.
What is new in our approach with respect to the interventional
framework is the idea of considering when causal effects occur
naturally in a system. This also led us to consider probability
distributions of interventions, while Pearl focuses on the analysis
of single interventions [10]. The novelty of our contribution,
based on the proposal of the criteria of the existence of natural
causal effects and the maintenance of the natural joint
distribution, results from the different aims that the analysis of
causal effects between brain regions has with respect to other
applications envisaged in the development of interventional
causality. In general, in medical research e.g. [59] or epidemi-
ology [60], one is really interested in assessing the effect of
external interventions that alter the system. However this is not in
general the case when studying causality in the brain, at least for
the type of analysis in which Granger causality or Dynamic
Causal Modeling are commonly applied.
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potentials of causal analysis applied to study brain dynamics and to
complement a recent vivid debate about brain causality [14].
Understanding the links between causal structure, causal effects
and statistical dependencies is a line of research complementary to
the development of more accurate models of brain dynamics [61].
We have written this paper in the context of neuroscience but the
concept of natural causal effects should clearly be useful in other
fields where effects of interacting subsystems are of importance.
Methods
We used tools from information theory (e.g. [45]) to
characterize the similarity of two probability distributions and
the statistical dependencies between variables. The basic quantity
is the Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL divergence). The KL
divergence is a measure of the difference between two probability
distributions and is defined as
KL(p (x),p(x)) ¼
D X
x
p (x)log
p (x)
p(x)
: ð18Þ
An important characteristic of the KL divergence is that it is a
non-negative number and is zero if and only if the two
distributions are identical. The mutual information
I(X;Y) ¼
D X
x,y
p(x,y)log
p(x,y)
p(x)p(y)
, ð19Þ
is a particular average of KL divergences
I(X;Y)~Ex½KL(p(yjx),p(y)) ~Ey½KL(p(xjy),p(x)) ð 20Þ
that quantifies the interdependence between the random variables.
We have considered two examples, one in the main text and one
in Supporting Information S1. In these examples we calculated
KL divergences for some particular distributions resulting from
stationary processes for which these measures can be calculated
analytically. For the bivariate Markov binary stationary processes
we used the Jensen-Shannon divergence (JSD) instead of the KL
divergence because it is well defined for probabilities with different
domains [62]. The JSD corresponds to an average of two KL
divergences:
JSD(p (x),p(x)) ¼
D 1
2
KL(p (x),
p(x)zp (x)
2
)
z
1
2
KL(p(x),
p(x)zp (x)
2
)
ð21Þ
and is bounded between ½0,1 .
For the bivariate linear Gaussian stationary processes the KL
divergence can be expressed in terms of the mean and covariance
matrix of the distributions. This can be derived in analogy to the
entropy of a multivariate Gaussian distribution (see Theorem 8.4.1
in [45]). For two Gaussian distributions N(m1,
X
2) and
N(m2,
X
2) The KL divergence is:
KL(N(m1,
P
1),N(m2,
P
2))~
1
2
(tr(1{
X {1
2
X
1
)
zln
j
P
2j
j
P
1j
z(m2{m1)
T X {1
2
(m2{m1)):
ð22Þ
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